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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of financial restructuring announcements on short-term
stock returns of banks and non-financial companies during the East Asian crisis. We find
that the prices of bank stocks respond positively to announcements relating to
government guarantees of bank liabilities. Non-financial companies increase in value
upon the announcement of guarantees but announcements that favor the use of public
funds for liquidity and capital support for banks negatively affect their stock prices.
These results suggest that announcements of deposit guarantees may provide comfort to
market participants during a crisis of confidence, but that the provision of public funds
for bank bail-outs were not necessarily viewed as credible means to restore the health of
the financial sector.
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11 Introduction
The East Asian crisis began in Thailand in mid-1997, when an ailing financial sector, an
export slowdown, and large increases in central bank credit to weak financial institutions
triggered a run on the Baht. The crisis then spread to other countries in the region as
common vulnerabilities and revaluations of risks in emerging markets triggered large
capital outflows.  The East Asian crisis countries took a variety of steps to address
problems in their banking systems. Recent papers have begun to review the policy
responses of the East Asian crises countries and assess the success of the policies
followed in the different countries in terms of restoring the health of the bank and
corporate sectors (Claessens, Klingebiel, Djankov 1999; Lindgren et al. 1999).
To improve our understanding of the impact of different policy responses to
financial crises, we investigate how stock markets across East Asian countries reacted to
the initial policy announcements of bank and financial restructuring. More specifically,
we examine separately how the banking and the non-financial sectors fared upon
announcement of different bank restructuring measures in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
and Thailand.  Our focus is on the announcement effect of five types of measures
typically used by governments to restore overall public confidence and to revitalize
financial and corporate sectors:  liquidity support to banks, guarantees of bank liabilities,
bank closures, the provision of public funds for the recapitalization of financial
institutions, and the creation of publicly owned centralized asset management companies.
This study will help to understand whether market participants perceived various policies
as effective or ineffective in restoring the health of the financial sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related
literature on stock price responses during financial crises.  Section 3 briefly depicts the
financial restructuring experiences in East Asia.  Section 4 presents the method and data
followed by Section 5 that lays out the analysis and summarizes the results.  Section 6
concludes.
2 Related Literature on Stock Price Responses during Financial Crises
Our analysis incorporates the essentials of two similar approaches of research on the
effects of financial crises on stock prices. The first one relates to the assessment of the
market’s perception of the effectiveness of policy measures that have been taken to
resolve currency or banking crises. The second one concerns work that aims at
investigating whether policy announcements affect stock prices during a financial crisis.
In this section we briefly discuss these studies.
Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998) investigate whether the policies announced by
the Argentine government helped to prevent spillover effects of the Mexican crisis of
1994-95. Ganapolsky and Schmukler argue that those announcements that were
successful in preventing contagion will have had positive impact on share prices.
Ganapolsky and Schmukler find that the agreement of Argentina with the IMF had a
strong positive impact on Argentinean stock market returns. However, policy measures
such as the creation of a fiduciary fund for bank capitalization, the constitution of a fund
2to purchase non-performing loans and the establishment of deposit insurance did not have
a strong effect on stock prices.
The analysis of Ganapolsky and Schmukler suggests that the agreement between
the Argentine government and the IMF during the Mexican crisis restored confidence on
the local stock market. Kho and Stulz (1999) also focus on the impact of IMF agreements
but they concentrate on the value of bank stocks during the Asian crisis. Their sample
consists of the listed banks in six Asian and four Western countries. The results indicate
that IMF agreements with Asian countries had little effect on the value of local banks.
Moreover, the stock prices of Western banks were also unaffected by the IMF bail out
news. This suggests that the announcement of the IMF agreements did not reduce
systemic risks because that would have led to an increase in the market value of Western
banks.
A similar analysis is provided by Kho, Lee, and Stulz (1999). The focus there is
solely on US banks, which stock prices are followed during financial crises other than the
East Asian one. They do find evidence of bank bailouts, and find that the value of banks
with exposures to a crisis country is negatively affected by currency crises and that it
responds positively to IMF or central bank bailouts. US banks without exposure to such
countries are again mostly unaffected by crisis events in these countries.
Djankov, Jindra and Klapper (2000) concentrate on the market value of non-
financial firms that have a credit relation with insolvent banks. Their main goal is to
analyze the effects of the resolution of bank insolvency on the market value of firms that
borrow from these banks. They focus on the East Asian financial crisis and distinguish
between four different exit-routes for insolvent banks: closure, foreign sale, domestic
merger, and nationalization. Their results indicate that the announcement of these
resolutions have different effects on the value of the borrowing firms. In particular, they
find that a closure leads to a reduction in the value of firms that used to borrow from the
closed bank. This suggests that relationships between banks and firms in these three
Asian countries added value to the firms and that closures are disruptive because they end
these relationships.
Peek and Rosengren (forthcoming) investigate the impact of various policy
announcements by the Japanese government on the premium that Japanese banks have to
pay on their Eurodollar and Euro-yen interbank loans relative to competing international
banks.  The only announcements that appear to have had a systematic effect on the
“Japan premium” are ones involving well-specified concrete actions by the government.
The most prominent example was reduction in the premium that accompanied the
announcement of the injection of funds into the banking system by the government.
All the previous papers look at whether announcements concerning bailouts, IMF
agreements or the resolution of bank insolvencies affect stock prices. Kaminsky and
Schmukler (1999) take a reverse approach and study whether market jitters (i.e. large
movements in the price index of a national stock market) can be explained by
government policy announcements during crises. This methodology is in sharp contrast
with the standard event study methodology. Rather than defining event dates ex ante and
assessing whether the market experienced abnormal returns on these dates, they select
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market returns of nine East Asian countries during the 1997-98 period. They find that
large movements often coincide with news about agreements with international
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Their analysis therefore suggests that
the announcement of such agreements, which tend to be accompanied by financial
restructuring programs, in fact contains information that is not yet incorporated in equity
prices.
Our work adds to this literature in two ways.  First, we examine the impact of
various policy announcements on both banks and non-financial firms.  This allows us to
study the response of the stock market at a more disaggregate level and permits us to
investigate the impact of the policy announcements on the banking and non-financial
sectors of the economy simultaneously.  Second, we concentrate on a number of concrete
policy measures to explore the immediate consequences of financial restructuring
announcements that occur in the midst of a financial crisis.  Our particular focus is on
announcements made by East Asian governments during 1997 and 1998.  The next
section briefly introduces the different policies that were followed during the crisis period
in these countries.
3 Financial Restructuring in East Asia: A Brief Review
A full blown financial crisis swept Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia and to a lesser extent
Malaysia. The Thai devaluation in July of 1997 triggered a withdrawal of capital from the
region as investors started to look more critically at financial sector weaknesses and
macro-economic imbalances. The currency and banking crises resulted in a severe
economic downturn in all East Asian economies. Governments in the four crises
countries employed different restructuring strategies for their bank- and corporate sectors.
As is typical in most financial crises, the East Asian governments were slow to
address financial distress (Waxman and Hunamalai, 1999). They tried to keep insolvent
institutions afloat by injecting liquidity (Table 1)—and in doing so, incurred large fiscal
costs. The delayed and sometimes partial response of governments to emerging
weaknesses of financial institutions led to financial turbulence and runs on financial
institutions. Governments responded to the crisis in public confidence (Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand) or foreign currency outflows (Korea) by issuing unlimited
guarantees on financial systems’ liabilities during 1997 and early 1998.
Bank restructuring strategies. The Government responses and progress on financial
restructuring have varied considerably in the East Asian countries. Authorities in Korea
and Malaysia moved relatively aggressively to strengthen their banking system through
injections of public funds (with little conditionality attached) for recapitalizations,
nationalizations, removal of bad debt, and mergers. The Thai authorities moved
aggressively on finance companies, closing two-thirds of them. In contrast, the Thai
government has given banks a transition period to raise capital and offered public funds
with tight conditionality attached. Indonesia put a public recapitalization program in
place, but bank restructuring is still today at an early stage.
4Table 1
Financial distress resolutions and bank recapitalization strategies (as of Fall 1998)
Indonesia Republic of Korea Malaysia Thailand
Initial government response
Substantial liquidity $21.7 billion $23.3 billion $9.2 billion $24.1 billion
support (17.6% of GDP) (5% of GDP) (13% of GDP) (20% of GDP)
Government guarantees Yes Yes Yes Yes
When issued? 1/98 11/97 End-97 8/97
Financial distress resolutions
Bank shutdowns 64 of 237 None None 1 of 15
Shutdowns of other Not applicable More than 117 None 57 of 91
financial institutions
Mergers of financial 4 of 7 state banks 11 of 26 absorbed 58 to be merged 3 banks and
institutions to merge by other banks into 6 groups 12 finance companies
Nationalizations 12 4 1 and 3 finance 4
companies
Bank recapitalization strategies
Public funds for Plan in place; some Government injected Danamodal injected Plan in place;
recapitalizations bonds issued $ 8 billion into $1.6 billion into government injected
9 commercial banks; 10 institutions $8.9 billion into
5 out of 6 major banks private banks and
now 90% controlled $11.7 billion into
by state public banks
Majority foreign Allowed, Allowed, 2 completed Not allowed Allowed, 2 completed
ownership of banks 1 potentially and 1 near finalization and 4 pending
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (1999).
Asset resolution strategies.  The crisis countries have also taken different
approaches to asset resolution (Table 2). Authorities in Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia
have actively removed bad loans from banks and transferred them to centralized,
government-owned and -managed asset management companies. The Indonesian
government has transferred $66 billion of the assets of closed banks and the worst loans
of intervened and state banks—equivalent to 116 percent of the banking system’s non-
performing loans and 48 percent of GDP—to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency.
The Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) purchased about 26 percent of
non-performing loans (worth $37 billion) at an average of 45 cents to the dollar.
Malaysia’s Danaharta asset management company has bought 50 percent of non-
performing loans (worth $14 billion) at discounts of 30–50 percent. In all three countries
the transfer of assets has substantially reduced non-performing loans in banks. Thailand’s
government has left the responsibility for loan workout and asset recovery with banks.
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Asset resolution strategies (as of Fall 2000)
Strategy Indonesia Republic of Korea Malaysia Thailand
Set up centralized Yes. Asset management Yes. Kamco has Yes. Danaharta has No. The workout of
asset management unit has accumulated accumulated $37 billion purchased $14 billion nonperforming loans is
company to which $66 billion of assets. assets. of assets. decentralized. Several large
banking system’s bank have established
nonperforming loans private asset management
companies
Centralized asset Yes Initially assets were Purchased assets are Not applicable
management purchased above valued by independent
companies purchase market-clearing prices outside auditors
assets at subsidized with recourse. Since
prices February 1998
purchases have been
attempted at market
prices
Type of assets Worst assets No particular strategy Loans larger than Not applicable
 transferred  5 million ringgit and
mostly loans secured
by property or shares
Assets transferred 48% of 1999 GDP 10% of 1997 GDP 18% of 1997 GDP Not applicable
Assets disposed of as 1.5% 40% 5% Not applicable
share of total assets
transferred
Source: Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (1999), and Dado (2000).
After a steep decline in output in 1998, the macro-economic condition of the four
crises countries improved considerably during 1999 and growth turned positive. Yet,
while governments have made significant strides and spent substantial resources to clean
up their financial systems, banks in all crises economies have remained inadequately
capitalized as their main clients, corporations, remain financially distressed (Claessens,
Djankov, Klingebiel 1999).
While the section above analyzed the financial restructuring strategies of the East
Asian crises economies, it did not examine how the announcements of financial
restructuring measures where received by the market.  This will be assessed in the
sections below.
64 Method and Data
4.1 Sample and Event Study Setup
We concentrate our analysis on four East Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia
and Thailand. All four of these countries experienced a serious financial sector crisis
during the late 1990s and, as laid out in the previous section, used a variety of policy
measures in response to it. To be able to analyze how these financial restructuring efforts
were perceived by investors, we need precise information on when they were
communicated to the public. We therefore use a large number of sources to obtain
accurate data on the policy announcements. First of all, we investigate all the issues of
the Asian Wall Street Journal from June 1997 until September 19981.  Second, we use
official documents that are reported on the homepages of the central banks and the local
governments of the four countries involved, the World Bank and the IMF. These relate to
press releases of the local governments and central banks about financial restructuring
policies and to so called Adjustment Loans Agreement and Letters of Intents, that among
others detailed financial restructuring strategies that were presented to the World Bank
and the IMF by the crises countries. Third, we rely on published reports by the World
Bank and the IMF and papers by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b), Enoch (2000)
and Radelet and Sachs (1998). All of these provide detailed information about the
policies of East Asian governments during the financial crisis.
To properly capture the perceived effect of a policy in the event study, determining
the precise time at which the information hits the market is crucial.  An important timing
issue concerns the problem of inside information. At the time the government makes the
announcement, the information may have already been leaked to key market participants.
Policy announcements will then contain little information for stock prices as the news is
already incorporated. To accommodate for such effects, we will use an event window that
includes the first trading day before the announcement date. This allows us to capture
market re-valuations that immediately precede policy announcements. To the extent that
the market’s lead exceeds this single day, our analysis will fail to detect market
responses, and this procedure may underestimate the effect on the stock prices. Stretching
the event window even further to include earlier trading days seems inappropriate,
however, because it would increase the risk of erroneously attributing market
developments to specific policy announcements or simply introducing noise that would
bias our findings towards zero. This danger especially exists when the market is volatile,
which will obviously be the case during a financial crisis. For this same reason, we
decided to include only the first trading day after the event date in our analysis. Hence,
the event window that we will use consists of three days: the event date, the first trading
day before the event date and the first trading day after the event date.
In interpreting the market response, it is important to consider the credibility of the
policy announcement. As Peek and Rosengren (forthcoming) found, general policy
statements not associated with very specific action plans had little effect in Japan.  If the
market does not believe that the government will follow through, then a lack of a stock
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been put in place by the respective governments.
7market reaction may reflect a lack of credibility rather than a lack of perceived impact of
such a policy.  Thus, a negligible reaction to a policy announcement does not necessarily
imply that the market believes that the measures would have no impact but it may also
reflect an assessment by market participants that the measures will not be effectively
implemented.  As we will describe below, the Indonesian government, for example, made
very similar policy announcements on multiple occasions, suggesting that the earlier
announcements did not result in implementation of the policy.
4.2 Stock Market Data
Our stock market data are obtained from the Global Indices series of Datastream, which
are provided on a daily basis in local currencies. Datastream constructs these indices for a
large number of countries by selecting the most important and liquid stocks of their local
markets. There are approximately 50 stocks in these indices for Indonesia and Thailand.
For South Korea and Malaysia, Datastream selects around 100 stocks. Datastream then
distinguishes between different sectors and industries.
The Global Indices are particularly useful for our purpose because they contain
separate series for banks and non-financial firms.2   In each of the countries we examine,
bank stocks constitute a significant fraction of total market capitalization.3 Thus, using
the regular Datastream composite/market index for these countries would not allow us to
distinguish movements in bank stocks from movements in the rest of the market. The
Global Indices, however, allow us to obtain a clear indicator for the reactions on the stock
market that are specific to banks by subtracting the return of non-financial stocks from
the bank stocks return. Throughout the paper, we refer to this as the excess return of bank
stocks.4
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the daily stock returns. The data for the
years 1997-1998 show that average daily returns on bank stocks were negative in all four
countries over those two years. Except for Malaysia, banks seriously under-performed
non-financial stocks over that period. Nevertheless, because of the extremely volatile
nature of the markets during this period, average daily excess returns for the banks are
not statistically different from zero in any of the countries. This is also true for daily
excess returns, but is not the case for sub-periods. If we distinguish between 1997 and
1998, however, we find that the underperformance of banks in Indonesia and Malaysia is
statistically significant in 1997.  In Malaysia, bank stocks then recovered to outperform
                                                
2 As of May 2000, for example, the Global Indices series for banks contain 8 to 10 stocks for each of the
four countries that we focus on.  We were unable to retrieve, however, precisely which banks were
represented in the series during the years for which we perform our analysis.
3 The fraction in the total market capitalization of the bank stocks represented in the Datastream indices
amounted to 5 percent of the total market capitalization in Indonesia, 11 percent in Korea, 13 percent in
Malaysia, and 27 percent in Thailand, as of end 1997. These figures exclude banks that are not represented
in the Datastream indices and non-bank financial institutions.
4 Only the Datastream index for Korea and Thailand consists solely of banks. For Indonesia and Malaysia,
Datastream just reports indices that cover the financial stocks of these markets, that is, including finance
companies and merchant banks. Note that since many Thai banks owned finance companies and many
Korean banks owned merchant banks the Datastream bank indices for these two countries will reflect to
some degree the performance of non-bank financial institutions as well.
8the rest of the market in 1998. In Korea, the bulk of the under-performance of banks is
concentrated in 1998.
Table 3 also reports the summary statistics for 1999. Banks in Korea and Thailand
continued to under-perform non-financial firms by a wide margin in 1999, although the
excess (negative) returns for the banks are not statistically significant.  In contrast, bank
stocks in Malaysia statistically significantly outperform the rest of their country’s market
in 1999.  Also, returns are positive for both banks and non-financials in 1999 for all four
countries.5
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Daily Stock Return Data (in percentages).
All returns are in local currencies and logarithmic. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting the return of
non-financial stocks from the bank stocks return. The mean daily excess returns for banks that are
significantly different from zero are indicated by asterisks.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Mean (sd)
1997-1998
Return Bank Stocks -0.30 (5.02) -0.13 (4.14) -0.17 (3.78) -0.23 (4.51)
Return Non-financials -0.03 (3.01) 0.04 (3.11) -0.13 (2.97) -0.09 (2.84)
Excess Return Bank Stocks -0.26 (4.16) -0.18 (3.07) -0.04 (1.84) -0.13 (3.15)
1997
Return Bank Stocks -0.46 (3.69) -0.21 (3.26) -0.46 (3.00) -0.40 (3.65)
Return Non-financials -0.11 (2.24) -0.14 (2.68) -0.22 (2.26) -0.19 (2.52)
Excess Return Bank Stocks **-0.35 (2.52) -0.08 (2.36) **-0.24 (1.50) -0.21 (2.27)
1998
Return Bank Stocks -0.12 (6.14) -0.05 (4.86) 0.11 (4.41) -0.05 (5.23)
Return Non-financials 0.06 (3.62) 0.22 (3.48) -0.04 (3.54) 0.00 (3.13)
Excess Return Bank Stocks -0.17 (5.32) -0.28 (3.63) 0.15 (2.13) -0.05 (3.86)
1999
Return Bank Stocks 0.20 (6.80) 0.01 (3.86) 0.25 (2.12) 0.04 (3.62)
Return Non-financials 0.19 (2.30) 0.37 (2.70) 0.12 (1.62) 0.17 (2.07)
Excess Return Bank Stocks 0.00 (6.08) -0.36 (3.30) *0.13 (1.12) -0.13 (2.78)
(sd) = standard deviation of the daily stock returns.
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
Source: Datastream Global Indices.
4.3 A Chronology of Financial Restructuring Announcements
Appendix 2 of this paper contains the results of our search for bank policy
announcements. The chronology shows that there were relatively few financial
restructuring announcements in Malaysia where the financial crisis appeared to be less
pronounced. For Indonesia, the bulk of the announcements took place in 1998. Also, the
Indonesian government seems to have made the same policy announcements on different
dates. For example, both the phasing out of liquidity support and the tightening of loan
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levels only in local currency values, not in dollar terms.
9classification and provisioning were announced by the government on several occasions
in late 1997 and 1998.
The chronology also reveals that governments frequently made multiple policy
announcements on a single day. Especially the announcement of IMF agreements tended
to be accompanied by statements concerning different measures to reform the financial
sector. As a result, we might face a mixed event as we investigate the impact of the
announcement of a specific policy measure. This makes it more difficult to asses the
effect of the specific announcement. We will attempt to disentangle the effects of the
different policies in the next section.
As a preliminary analysis, we relate the policy announcements in Appendix 2 to the
incidence of large movements in the prices of bank stocks. This will reveal whether the
announcements tend to contain information for market participants that is relevant for the
stock prices of banks. If the announcements were already communicated informally to
the market or if they were fully anticipated by the market, we do not expect to observe
many jitters around the event date. In that case, studying the short-term effects of policy
announcements on stock prices will not be very promising.
To investigate whether bank stocks indeed tended to be moved by financial
restructuring announcements, we selected the 25 largest swings in each year of the return
on bank stocks and of the excess return on banks. We do this for each country and for
each year. Assuming 250 trading days per year, these dates represent the 10% largest
movements of the year (in absolute values). We then check which of these days fall
inside the event window of the financial restructuring announcements (which includes the
event date and the first trading day before and after that date).
The results of this exercise, which are reported in Table A2 of Appendix 2, show
that policy announcements are frequently accompanied by relatively high or low returns
on bank stocks and excess returns.6 This holds for all four countries, suggesting that the
announcement contained news that was relevant to the market in each country. In the
next section, we analyze these responses in detail.
5 Analysis and Results
We focus on five types of bank policy announcements. These concern announcements
regarding:
(1) the type of liquidity support policy of the central bank,
(2) a guarantees of bank liabilities,
(3) bank closures and interventions,
(4) capital support policy of the government,
                                                
6 Depending on the country and the year, 8 percent to 52 percent of the large movements are associated
with the policy announcements that we analyze.  The bank jitters that do not coincide with policy
announcements are mostly related to macro events, such as a change in the exchange rate regime, the lifting
of investment restrictions, and political events, such as resignations of Ministers of Central Bank officials.
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(5) the establishment of publicly-owned and managed asset management
companies.
A recent paper by Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) has shown that this set of crisis
management strategies can be systematically linked to fiscal costs of banking crises for a
large sample of countries. Given their sizeable impact on fiscal costs we belief it is
reasonable to presume that the announcement of these policies has had an impact on asset
prices as well.
The first step we take is to extract these types of announcements from the
chronology provided in Appendix 2 and to calculate the associated returns using an event
window of three days. This will provide a data set of policy events and stock market
responses. The second step then is to analyze these data in search of patterns in stock
market responses.
Panels A-E of Table A1 in Appendix 1 show the outcome of the first step of our
analysis. Each panel concentrates on a different policy announcement and the events are
grouped per country. The panels also indicate whether or not the announcement was
simultaneous with other financial restructuring announcements and it reports the other
policy measures if this is indeed the case. The returns associated with each event are
averages per day for the event window. By using averages in stead of cumulative returns,
we create comparability across announcements that are made over the weekend. For
those events, the window only consists of two trading days (instead of three). Statistically
significant returns are bold faced and accompanied by * or **, depending on whether
they are significant at the 10 percent or 5 percent level. Few of the individual entries are
associated with a statistically significant stock market response.
Now that we have data on stock price responses to policy announcements, we can
use them to determine whether there is a pattern in the response of the stock market. For
this, we need to deal with two issues. First, we would like to exploit the responses to each
type of policy announcement by using all the individual announcements. By focussing on
a single event in the way we do in Table A1, i.e. by calculating t-statistics for each
individual event, we neglect the information that is contained in the responses to similar
announcements that are made at a different time or in another country. For example, it
may be that closures and interventions negatively affect bank stocks in each country but
that the effect of each announcement is generally too small to detect if one focuses on a
single event. The second issue relates to the mixed nature of some of the announcements.
As we argued earlier, it will be difficult to assess the effect of a specific announcement if
the government declares different policy measures at the same time. Table A1 shows that
our sample of policy events contains many mixed events. The Korean government for
example, made announcements concerning all five policy variables on a single day
(December 5, 1998).
We now proceed in the following way. First we determine the average stock price
response for each type of policy announcement. We thereby neglect the specific country
in which the event took place, and the relative importance of subsequent announcements
in a country. In doing so, we further subdivide the announcements concerning liquidity
support and capital support into announcement that either favor or disfavor the use of
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public funds. We then have an indication of how the stock market reacted to each type of
announcement while using all the relevant individual events. After that, we set-up a
regression analysis that attempts to address the problems associated with mixed events
and that allows us to assess the statistical significance of the results.
Through this type of analysis we wish to establish the impact of the announcements
on the market, where we distinguish between financial and non-financials. As a
benchmark for calculating abnormal returns we simply use a zero response, that is we set
normal performance returns equal to zero on event dates, and consider returns that differ
significantly from zero to be abnormal. Our analysis thus differs from standard event
studies that use a model to create a benchmark for the asset returns during event dates.7
To avoid issues of the appropriate model specification for our countries during the
sample period, we assume that the mean return is constant at zero.  The null hypothesis in
our empirical work thus is that returns are equal to zero on event dates.
As a preliminary analysis, we investigate whether those policy announcements that
suggest an increase in the use of public funds to support banks affect stock prices, thus
combining several types of government support measures.  If the transfer of funds was
unanticipated by the market and credible, we expect that the prices of bank stocks will
respond positively. The effect on the stock prices of non-financial firms is less obvious.
On the one hand, if banks are important for these firms to conduct their business, public
support for banks might affect stock prices positively. On the other hand, stock prices of
non-financial may be negatively affected.  The transfer of public funds to the financial
sector might be costly for non-financial firms as the government needs to recoup the
costs, by for example increasing overall taxes. Or the market may perceive that the
measures announced will not effectively restore the health of the banking system and
therefore, banks may continue to curtail their lending activities.  The impact on the non-
financials, however, must be interpreted with caution.  For the banks, policy
announcements related to their restructuring and bail-out are likely to be the key driving
forces behind the daily movements; for the non-financials, this is less likely to be the
case.  To the extent that other news events are influencing the non-financials, any
interpretation of the movements in the non-financials will be less precise.
We first pool all the announcements reported in Table A1 into one data set.
Avoiding duplication, we obtain a sample of 39 events. We then determine which of
these events involve an announcement that suggests the use of public funds to support
banks. Assuming that government support for the establishment of asset management
companies involved the transfer of public funds to banks, there are 22 of these
announcements. We then regress the stock price responses on a constant and a dummy
variable indicating (an increase in) the use of public funds. The results are reported in
Table 4.
                                                
7 Two widely used approaches, that are described in MacKinlay (1997), are the constant-mean-return model
and the market model. The first model assumes that average asset return is constant. The second model
corrects for movements in the overall market by relating asset returns to returns of the market index. The
market model is used in Kho and Stulz (1999).
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Table 4: Regression Results for the Announcement Effect of Public Support for
Banks
The sample consists of the event dates that are reported in the Table A1 of Appendix 1, which are pooled
into one database. Avoiding duplication, this produces a sample of 39 announcements.  The dependent
variables in the regressions are the average daily stock returns for each event, where the returns are
calculated using a window of three days. The independent variables are discrete, where the dummy variable
equals one if on the event date an announcement was made that indicate a transfer of public funds to banks.
This holds for announcements that suggest that banks will be helped through the ease of liquidity support,
the announcement of government guarantees for depositors and creditors, the announcement of public
funds for bank recapitalizations and the announcement that the government will support the establishment
of asset management companies. The t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard
errors.
Return Banks
(t-Statistic)
Return Non-
financials
(t-Statistic)
Excess Return
Banks
(t-Statistic)
Constant -0.82 0.36 *-1.18
(-0.64) (0.91) (-2.01)
Dummy for announcements that involve a *1.57 -0.12 **1.69
transfer of public funds towards banks (1.92) (-0.22) (2.39)
R-squared 0.09 0.00 0.14
Adj. R-squared 0.07 -0.00 0.12
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.06 0.83 0.02
Number of Observations 39 39 39
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
The announcement effect of public support for banks is positive when considering
the return of bank stocks or their excess returns.  This finding parallels that in Peek and
Rosengren (forthcoming) that policy announcements involving the provision of funds to
the banking sector have the strongest effect on the banking sector relative to other types
of announcements of government policy towards the banks. For non-financials, there is
no effect of these types of announcements relative to the others.
Table 5 contains the stock price responses for each of the different types of policy
announcements. The averages are calculated from the data presented in Appendix 1 using
all the events in each panel. The number of announcements involved is presented in
parenthesis. Let us first look at the column for the return of bank stocks. The average
response to the announcement of a guarantee on bank liabilities equals a little more than
1.6 percent per day. Assuming that there are three trading days in all the event windows,
this implies a cumulative increase in bank stock prices of roughly 5 percent.  Reactions of
similar magnitude are found for the twelve announcements that relate to asset
management companies. The non-financial stocks also move in a positive direction upon
these announcements, suggesting that the market perceived them as good for both the
banking and non-financial corporate sector.  The government guarantee of bank liabilities
even brings forth a larger positive movement from the non-financial sector than from the
banking sector.8
                                                
8 As noted above, this interpretation assumes that no other important news events affected the non-financial
sector.
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The announcements of bank closures or interventions tend to have a small effect on
the stock returns of banks and a small negative excess return for them.  Announcements
of more freely available (more restrictive) liquidity support for banks lead to positive
(negative) excess returns for the banks.   The absolute returns to the non-financial sector
go in the opposite way:  non-financial decline (rise) when more liberal (more restrictive)
liquidity support is announced.  Public funds for recapitalization lead to a positive excess
return for the banks, although both the banks and the non-financials have negative
absolute returns.  Although there are only four observations of announcements indicating
that the government will not provide public funds for recaps, banks experience a positive
excess return and both the banks and non-financials have positive absolute returns.  These
responses suggest that announcements regarding the non-availability of public funds for
bank recapitalizations signal to the market that the banking problems were not as severe
as had been expected and/or that the government may be able to contain the fiscal costs
of the crisis.  This interpretation would also be consistent with the positive reaction by
both banks and non-financials to the announcement of restrictions on liquidity support.
Table 5: Policy Announcements and Stock Returns.
The table contains the stock price responses for five different types of policy announcements. The averages
are calculated using the data presented in the tables in Appendix 1. For each type of policy announcement,
the average daily return is calculated using all the events in the four countries. The number of
announcements that is used is presented in parenthesis. The ‘Excess Return of Banks’ is calculated by
subtracting the return on non-financial stocks from bank stocks return. The announcements concerning
liquidity support and capital support are further subdivided into announcements that favor or disfavor the
use of public funds for liquidity or capital support.
Return Banks Return Non-
financials
Excess Return of
Banks versus
Non-financials
Return (#) Return (#) Return (#)
Announcement that liquidity support will be
freely available
0.12 (6) -0.37 (6) 0.48 (6)
Announcement that provision of liquidity
support will be restricted
0.74 (5) 1.09 (5) -0.34 (5)
Announcement that all bank liabilities will be
fully guaranteed
1.60 (8) 2.02 (8) -0.42 (8)
Announcement regarding the closure or
intervention into financial institutions
0.16 (17) 0.51 (17) -0.35 (17)
Announcements that include the use of public
funds for recapitalizing banks’ balance sheets
-0.06 (9) -0.92 (9) 0.87 (9)
Announcement that preclude the use of public
funds for recapitalizing banks’ balance sheets
1.29 (4) 0.40 (4) 0.89 (4)
Announcement regarding the establishment of
a publicly-owned, centrally managed asset
management company
1.24 (11) 0.64 (11) 0.60 (11)
(#) = total number of policy announcements used to calculate the response on the stock market
In the above discussion of the results of Table 5, we have not investigated the
statistical significance of the stock market responses. Analyzing the significance requires
us to calculate the standard errors for each policy announcement and for each stock return
measure. Because the data comes from different countries and because the number of
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trading days that is used to calculate the response to each individual varies, this is not a
straightforward task.
To tackle both of these issues, we design a regression approach using all the
individual announcements that are reported in Table A1 of Appendix 1. Again, we pool
all the announcements reported in Table A1 into one data set. Next we transform the
policy announcements to discrete variables that can be used as independent variables in a
regression. Announcements of guarantees, closures or interventions in financial
institutions and the establishment of a publicly owned centrally managed asset
management companies to which non-performing loans of banks are transferred to are
transformed into dummy variables that equal one if on the event date such an
announcement was made. Liquidity support and capital support policies are captured by
two separate variables that equal –1, 0 or 1. In the case of liquidity support, a (-1) then
refers to announcements that imply that liquidity support will be restricted; a (1) then
refers to those types of announcements that suggest that liquidity support will be freely
available.  In the case of capital support, a (-1) refers to those types of announcements
that preclude the use of public funds for recapitalizing banks’ balance sheets, a (1) refers
to those types of announcements that imply that public funds will be made available. By
including only the 39 events related to the announcement of restructuring policy
measures in the analysis, our regression results gauge the announcement effect of each
type of policy measure relative to a zero return benchmark.  This allows us to determine
which specific type of policy measures have had an effect on stock prices and the
direction of the response.
Using the response to each announcement as dependent variables and the
transformed policy announcements as independent variables, we then perform OLS
regressions. By including indicator variables for each type of announcement, we can try
to disentangle the effects of each type of policy announcement when there is a mixed
event. We also include an indicator variable in the regressions to control for the effects of
an IMF agreement on stock prices. This variable equals one if on the event date an IMF
agreement was announced or if the government declared that it made significant progress
during the IMF negotiations.
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 6 and are generally consistent
with our earlier discussion. The return on banks is positive and statistically significant
with respect to the announcement of guarantees on banks’ liabilities. For the non-
financials, announcements concerning guarantees on bank liabilities are positive and
statistically significant.  Stock prices of non-financials, however, seem to react negatively
to announcements that liquidity support will be freely available and capital support will
be provided to strengthen banks’ balance sheets. Announcements with respect to the
establishment of setting up a publicly owned asset management company have no effect
on stock prices.
The IMF agreement dummy is negative and statistically significant in the
regression for the return of non-financials. This suggests that the macro-economic
policies laid out in the IMF agreements may have been perceived by the market as having
adverse effects on non-financial firms or may have been viewed by market participants as
a signal that the situation was more serious than expected. The sample of IMF related
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events is limited to those days on which announcements were made concerning the five
policy variables that we focus on. Our data set is not constructed to capture all the
announcements of IMF agreements or progress in the negotiations.
Table 6: Regression Results for the Effect of the Announcements of Bank Policy
Measures on Stock Returns
The sample consists of the event dates that are reported in the Table A1 of Appendix 1, which are pooled
into one database. Avoiding duplication, this produces a sample of 39 announcements.  The dependent
variables in the regressions are the average daily stock returns for each event, where the returns are
calculated using a window of three days. The independent variables are all discrete. The variable ‘Liquidity
Support’ equals one if there was an announcement that liquidity support would be made freely available.  It
equals minus one if an announcement was made that liquidity support was to be restricted. The variables
‘Guarantees for Depositors and Creditors’ and ‘Closure/Intervention’ are dummies that equal one if the
government announced guarantees on that date or if there was a closure or intervention in a financial
institution respectively. The ‘Capital Support’ dummy equals one if capital support was available and
minus one if capital support was not available. The ‘Asset Management Company’ variable is a dummy
that equals one if the government announces its intention to set up a publicly-owned centrally managed
asset management company. The ‘IMF’ variable is a dummy that takes the value one if on the event date,
an IMF agreement was announced or if the government declared that it made significant progress in the
IMF negotiations.  The t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
Return Banks
(t-Statistic)
Return Non-financials
(t-Statistic)
Excess Return Banks
(t-Statistic)
Liquidity Support -0.31 **-0.61 0.30
(-0.57) (-2.18) (0.57)
Guarantees for Depositors and Creditors **1.74 **1.30 0.44
(2.18) (2.47) (0.67)
Closure/Intervention -0.21 0.45 -0.66
(-0.26) (0.96) (-0.91)
Capital Support -0.86 ***-1.18 0.32
(-1.19) (-3.32) (0.43)
Public Asset Management Company 1.04 0.62 0.42
(1.33) (1.53) (0.54)
IMF Agreement -1.52 ***-1.87 0.35
(-1.54) (-5.25) (0.36)
R-squared 0.19 0.39 0.06
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.30 -0.08
Number of Observations 39 39 39
Number of Non-mixed Events 18 18 18
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
*** indicates significantly different from zero at the 1% level
To conclude our data analysis, we briefly look at the differences in stock responses
across countries. In constructing Table 5 and 6, we have ignored the specific country in
which the announcement was made. To investigate whether policy announcements were
interpreted differently across countries than Table 5 and 6 suggest, we reproduce Table 5
and 6 for each country. The results for the returns of bank stocks and non-financials are
reported in Table 7 and 8 respectively.
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Table 7: Policy Announcements and Bank Stock Returns in Four Asian Countries
The table contains the average return of bank stocks for the different types of policy announcements. The
averages are calculated using the data presented in the tables in Appendix 1. For each country and for each
type of policy announcement, the average daily return is calculated. The number of announcements that is
used for this calculation is presented in parenthesis. The announcements concerning liquidity support and
capital support are further subdivided into announcements that favor or disfavor the use of public funds for
liquidity or capital support.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Ret. (#) Ret. (#) Ret. (#) Ret. (#)
Announcement that liquidity support
will be freely available
0.69 (1) -0.10 (3) 0.47 (1) -0.17 (1)
Announcement that liquidity support
will be limited to those institutions
that are deemed solvent
0.33 (3) 6.30 (1) -3.58 (1)
Announcement that all bank
liabilities will be fully guaranteed
3.14 (2) 2.59 (3) 3.24 (1) -0.41 (2)
Announcement regarding the closure
or intervention into financial
institutions
-0.43 (5) 0.53 (4) 0.34 (8)
Announcements that include the use
of public funds for recapitalizing
banks’ balance sheets
-1.50 (4) 1.85 (3) -3.49 (1) 3.44 (1)
Announcement that preclude the use
of public funds for recapitalizing
banks’ balance sheets
2.42 (2) 0.47 (1) -0.17 (1)
Announcement regarding the
establishment of a publicly owned
centrally managed asset management
company
-0.76 (3) 1.90 (5) 2.11 (3)
(#) = total number of policy announcements used to calculate the response on the stock market
The figures in Table 7 indicate that the announcement of guarantees positively
affected the value of bank stock in all countries but in Thailand. In turn, the positive
effect of the announcement regarding the establishment of asset management companies
was apparent in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand9, but not in Indonesia. A similar
conclusion applies to the announcement effect of guarantees when we look at the returns
of non-financial stocks. Table 8 shows that Thailand is again the only country in which
these types of announcements did not seem to lead to a significant market appreciation.
In addition, the response of non-financial stocks in Thailand is also different than the
regression analysis would suggests with respect to announcements regarding liquidity and
capital support.  For example, the announcement of a more restrictive liquidity support
policy was associated with a decline in stock prices of non-financials.  This is in contrast
with the regression results in Table 6.
                                                
9 Contrary to the other three countries, Thailand did not set up a centralized, public asset management. The
reported effect relates to the announcement of plans to create private asset management companies.
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Table 8: Policy Announcements and Returns on Non-financial Stocks in Four East
Asian Countries.
The table contains the average return of bank stocks for the different types of policy announcements. The
averages are calculated using the data presented in the tables in Appendix 1. For each country and for each
type of policy announcement, the average daily return is calculated. The number of announcements that is
used for this calculation  is presented in parenthesis. The announcements concerning liquidity support and
capital support are further subdivided into announcements that favor or disfavor the use of public funds for
liquidity or capital support.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Ret. (#) Ret. (#) Ret. (#) Ret. (#)
Announcement that liquidity support
will be freely available
-0.39 (1) -0.41 (3) 0.14 (1) -0.71 (1)
Announcement that liquidity support
will be limited to those institutions
that are deemed solvent
0.85 (3) 3.53 (1) -0.65 (1)
Announcement that all bank
liabilities will be fully guaranteed
2.58 (2) 3.08 (3) 2.95 (1) 0.79 (2)
Announcement regarding the closure
or intervention into financial
institutions
1.66 (5) 0.14 (4) 0.94 (8)
Announcements that include the use
of public funds for recapitalizing
banks’ balance sheets
-0.93 (4) -0.76 (3) -1.90 (1) -0.40 (1)
Announcement that preclude the use
of public funds for recapitalizing
banks’ balance sheets
1.08 (2) 0.14 (1) -0.71 (1)
Announcement regarding the
establishment of a publicly owned
centrally managed asset management
company
0.81 (3) 0.36 (5) 0.94 (3)
(#) = total number of policy announcements used to calculate the response on the stock market
The country-by-country break down of the data in Tables 7 and 8 suggests that the
patterns we found in our earlier aggregate analysis seem to apply to Indonesia, Korea and
Malaysia. The data for Malaysia and Korea fit in nicely with all the conclusions for the
specific policy announcements. The data for Indonesia show only one major divergence,
which relates to the announcement effect of establishing a publicly-owned asset
management companies on the return of bank stocks which decline. This is somewhat
surprising as one may have thought that the bailout effect, i. e. the transfer of assets to the
AMCs at inflated prices would affect bank stock positively.  One possible explanation for
the negative stock market response may be that the market may have been concerned that
the transfer of massive amounts of assets to a publicly owned agency adversely affected
the overall payment discipline even of performing debtors.  In addition, the market may
have suspected that the massive amount of bad debt on the books of a government agency
susceptible to political pressure and with limited resolution capacity may adversely affect
the resolution of those loans remaining on the banks’ books.
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The responses for Thailand appear to have a somewhat different pattern. The
announcement effect of public guarantees on both bank stocks and non-financial stocks
are largely absent.  Announcements regarding the non-availability of public funds for
recaps and announcements regarding the provision of public funds for recaps both affect
bank stock negatively.  The negative announcement effect of “no public funds” for bank
recaps may have adversely affected banks’ stock prices because the market perceived that
these institutions would be financially to weak to restructure on their own.  Also, the
market may have reacted negatively to the announcement of a public recap scheme
because it perceived the capital support package as not generous enough to restore the
financial health of the banking system.  Moreover, the announcement effect of public
guarantees on both bank and non-financials is largely absent.  Bank returns in Thailand
react negatively to the announcement of a guarantee whereas bank stocks in other
countries react strongly positive. There are two potential explanations for this
phenomenon.  One, bank liabilities may have already been perceived to be covered by an
(implicit) government guarantee.  Or, the market perceived the issuance of a guarantee
not as a credible way to address the ensuing banking crisis.
6 Implications and Lessons
Although we must be cautious in drawing strong policy conclusions from a small number
of observations, our analysis of the reactions to bank restructuring policy announcements
during the East Asian financial crisis has revealed some suggestive patterns that merit
further investigation.  The patterns are roughly consistent across Indonesia, Korea, and
Malaysia but apply to Thailand to a lesser extent.
We find that the prices of bank stocks as well as non-financials respond positively
to announcements relating to government guarantees on bank liabilities. Banks stocks did
not respond to either announcements concerning the establishment of a government-
owned centrally managed asset management company or announcements that include
public recapitalization schemes aimed at strengthening banks’ capital base and generous
liquidity support programs. The non-financial companies, however, tended to react
negatively to announcements with regards to the use of public funds for capital support
and generous liquidity support for financial institutions.
Although we know that guarantees are costly over the long run (Honohan,
Klingebiel 2000), these results suggest that markets perceived the announcement of
government guarantees on bank liabilities as positive for both financial and non-financial
corporations.  Announcements of guarantees appear to have provided comfort to market
participants over the short run. The stock price decline of non-financials as a reaction to
announcements that include the use of public recapitalization schemes and more liberal
liquidity support may have a number of explanations.  The market may have been
concerned that public funds per se would not restore the financial health of the
institutions.  Rather than perceiving that the funds would be used to restructure bank
balance sheets and operations and allow banks to engage in meaningful corporate
restructuring, funds provided by the government may not have been perceived as
sufficient. Alternatively, the markets may have interpreted the announcements of
increased public support as a signal that financial institutions were in a financially weaker
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position than previously anticipated.  Finally, the decline in the stock price for non-
financial companies as a reaction to the announcement of generous liquidity support may
indicate that markets did not perceive the extension of liquidity support a credible enough
measure to address the financial problems in banks.
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Appendix 1
Table A1: Stock Returns and Financial Restructuring Announcements: Liquidity
Support (A), Guarantees of Bank Liabilities (B), Closures/Interventions (C), Capital
Support (D), Asset Management Companies (E).
The returns reported in the final three columns are the average daily returns for each event. We have used a three day event window to
measure stock price responses: the event date, the first trading day after the event day and the first trading day before the day of the
event. If the event falls in a weekend, the stock market response is calculated using the Monday and Friday returns only. If the first
trading day before the event was more than 3 days back because the stock exchange was closed during the other days, the event
window only consists of the event date and the first trading day after the event. An ‘(M)’ indicates whether or not the event was mixed
with other policy announcements. These are then reported in square brackets in the first column. * and ** denote that the stock price
response was significantly different from zero at the 10% and 5% respectively when using a t-test. The standard deviation of the
average daily return during the event is calculated as √(1/k)·σ(i,j), where k is the number of days used in calculating the response of
the stock market (i.e. 2 or 3) and σ(i) is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns for country i and return series j for the years
1997-1998 (See Table 1).
Panel A: Liquidity Support
Event
Date
Mixed
Event
(M)
Excess
Return
Bank
Index
Return
on the
Bank
Index
Return
Non-
Finan-
cials
Indonesia:
• Bank Indonesia eases local bank’s access to funds through
lower interest rates and reserve requirements.
10/20/97 1.08 0.69 -0.39
• 10 insolvent banks are under close monitoring and will
not receive special (i.e. at favorable terms) liquidity
support unless they are subject to bank runs.  Special
liquidity support for other banks will be phased out. [IMF
agreement, limited guarantees, closure of 16 small banks,
no compensation for shareholder losses, institutional
framework will be improved.]
11/01/97 M 0.52 2.85 2.33
• Access to liquidity support will be more restrictive and at
higher interest rates. [Position of IBRA will be
strengthened, corporate debt restructuring plans, details
for proposed plans for bankruptcy and judicial reforms.]
04/08/98 M -1.56 -2.20 -0.64
• Target date for restricting liquidity support is Nov. 1
1998. [Capital support for strong banks announced,
ability to sell bad assets to AMC (IBRA) for these same
banks announced.]
06/24/98 M -0.50 0.34 0.84
Korea
• Announcement of principle agreement for special loan for
Korean First Bank (KFB) to meet liquidity needs.
[Government support for troubled financial institutions by
letting KAMCO buy up assets.]
08/18/97 M -0.63 -1.45 -0.82
• Announcement that KFB and some merchant banks will
receive special loans at below market rates. [Guarantees
on all foreign liabilities of Korean Banks, capital support
for KFB, more funds to KAMCO for buying up bad
loans.]
08/25/97 M 0.95 0.46 -0.49
• Temporary liquidity support announced. [Full guarantee
announced, more funds for buying bad loans, request to
Japan to roll over st-debt owed by Korean banks,
exchange rate band widened.]
11/19/97 M 0.61 0.68 0.07
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• Large liquidity injections of recent weeks will be
reversed. [Blanket guarantees only until end of 2000,
insolvent fi’s will be closed, recapitalization requirement
without support, more funds for buying bad loans,
amendment of law to allow participation by foreign
investors.]
12/05/97 M 2.77 **6.30 **3.53
Malaysia
• There will be a new facility, but it will include penalty
rates and collateralization requirements. [Only public
funds for recapitalizations of firms and banks in which
government owns a stake, capital requirements lifted,
guarantees for buyers if finance companies, transparency
and better loan classification and provisioning standards,
more rigorous supervision, limitation on single party
lending.]
03/24/98 M 0.33 0.47 0.14
Thailand
• BoT announces that it will continue to help fi’s by
providing liquidity support but subject to conditionality
and at higher rates. [IMF agreement but funds cannot be
used for bail out finance sector, recapitalization required
without public support (shareholder losses if insufficient),
AMC announced but only for assets of intervened
institutions, stricter loan loss classification,  foreign
participation encouraged.]
08/14/97 M 0.54 -0.17 -0.71
• Announcement that access to liquidity support will be
tightened in the future. [Revised agreement with IMF.
Government commits to quickly decide on closure of
suspended finance companies and to toughen loan
classification and provisioning requirements.]
11/25/97 M -2.93 -3.58 -0.65
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
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Panel B: Guarantees of Liabilities
Event
Date
Mixed
Event
(M)
Excess
Return
Bank
Index
Return
on the
Bank
Index
Return
Non-
Finan-
Cials
Indonesia
• Small depositors of all banks will be compensated if
banks are closed, shareholder losses will not be
compensated and liabilities of non-financial firms will not
be guaranteed. [IMF agreement, special liquidity support
will be phased out, closure of 16 small banks, no
compensation for shareholder losses, institutional
framework will be improved.]
11/01/97 M 0.52 2.85 2.33
• Guarantees for all creditors and depositors of commercial
banks. [Establishment of IBRA which will be given great
power to deal with weak banks, freeze on debt service
suggested, corporate restructuring framework is being
developed (no public funds), bankruptcy procedures will
be strengthened.]
01/27/98 M 0.59 3.42 2.83
Korea
• Guarantees on all foreign liabilities of Korean Banks.
[Announcement that KFB and some merchant banks will
receive special loans at below market rates, capital
support for KFB, more funds to KAMCO for buying up
bad loans.]
08/25/97 M 0.95 0.46 -0.49
• Full guarantee of principal and interest on all types of
deposits of financial institutions. [Temporary liquidity
support announced, more funds for buying bad loans,
request to Japan to roll over st-debt owed by Korean
banks, exchange rate band widened.]
11/19/97 M 0.61 0.68 0.07
• Blanket guarantees will be phased out and replaced by
limited deposit insurance but not before end of 2000.
[Large liquidity injections will be reversed, insolvent fi’s
will be closed, recapitalization requirement without
support, more funds for buying bad loans, amendment of
law to allow participation by foreign investors.]
12/05/97 M 2.77 **6.30 **3.53
Malaysia
• Blanket guarantees for all depositors and creditors. 01/20/98 0.29 3.24 *2.95
Thailand
• Government guarantees that the depositors and creditors
of all finance and securities companies that are not
suspended will be protected. [On 06/27/97, 16 finance
companies were suspended.]
06/29/97 M -2.42 -0.23 2.20
• Government announces that depositors and creditors of
financial institutions are protected. [Announcement that
IMF negotiations are progressing, suspension of 42
finance companies.]
08/05/97 M 0.04 -0.59 -0.63
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
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  Panel C: Closures/Interventions
Event
Date
Mixed
Event
(M)
Excess
Return
Bank
Index
Return
on the
Bank
Index
Return
Non-
Finan-
Cials
Indonesia:
• Closure of 16 banks (assets are 3% of banking sector). Weak
banks have to submit rehabilitation plans, if these are
insufficient they will be closed. [IMF agreement, special
liquidity support will be phased out, limited guarantees, no
compensation for shareholder losses, institutional framework
will be improved.]
11/01/97 M 0.52 2.85 2.33
• Secret intervention in 54 banks: rights of shareholders and
managers remain intact but IBRA places officials within banks.
02/14/98 **-5.77 -3.09 2.68
• IBRA takes control over 7 large and 7 small banks that account
for 75% of the liquidity support (16% of bank sector liabilities).
04/04/98 2.52 3.96 1.45
• IBRA suspends rights of owners and management of the seven
large banks over which they took control at 04/03/98.
04/14/98 -1.97 -3.12 -1.15
• Government intervenes in 7 (small and large) banks by taking
them over, wiping out the stakes of current equityholders.
[Announcement that ‘strong’ banks will be recapitalized by the
government, full details will be developed by the end of
September, measures to promote corporate restructuring,
negotiations about repayment liquidity support with a few
banks, tax stimulation of mergers.]
08/21/98 M 0.92 -2.73 **-3.65
Korea
• 9 merchant banks suspended. [IMF agreement announced.] 12/02/97 M 2.50 1.69 -0.82
• Insolvent financial institutions will be closed. 2 commercial
banks need to prepare rehabilitation plans and will be closed if
these are insufficient. [Reversion of liquidity support, blanket
guarantees will be phased out by end of 2000, recapitalization
requirement without support, more funds for buying bad loans,
amendment of law to allow participation by foreign investors.]
12/05/97 M 2.77 **6.30 **3.53
• Operations of 5 merchant banks suspended. 12/10/97 -0.32 -2.79 -2.47
• 5 small commercial banks and 2 merchant banks are closed. 06/29/98 *-3.40 -3.09 0.32
Malaysia
         None
Thailand
• Suspension of 16 finance companies. [On 06/29/97, guarantees
announced.]
06/27/97 M -1.16 2.28 **3.44
• 42 finance companies suspended. [Announcement that IMF
negotiations are progressing, blanket guarantees.]
08/05/97 M 0.04 -0.59 -0.63
• Financial Restructuring Agency decides to close 56 of the 58
suspended finance companies.
12/08/97 *-4.06 -1.73 2.33
• Intervention in 1 severely undercapitalized medium-sized bank
(Bangkok Metro Bank). Management will be replaced and bank
is ordered to recapitalize within two weeks.
12/31/97 -0.52 0.57 1.09
• Bangkok Metro Bank is taken over by the central bank: equity
completely written down.
01/23/98 -2.32 -2.55 -0.23
• Central bank takes control over 2 midsize banks: Equity is
written down.
02/06/98 2.19 3.73 1.54
• Intervention in 7 finance companies that were unable to raise
capital. Ordered to write down their capital.
05/18/98 -1.75 -2.46 -0.72
• Intervention in 2 banks and 5 finance companies. Shareholder
stakes eliminated. [Provision of public funds to recapitalize fi’s,
capital requirements relaxed, development of framework for
creation of private AMCs. ]
08/14/98 M **3.84 3.44 -0.40
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
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Panel D: Capital Support Policy
Event
Date
Mixed
Event
(M)
Excess
Return
Bank
Index
Return
on the
Bank
Index
Return
Non-
Finan-
Cials
Indonesia
• Government announces that it will issue $18 billion in bonds to
recapitalize banking sector through IBRA. [Announcement that
the an AMC will absorb the assets of the 7 banks that were
intervened in on April 4 as well as the troubled assets of other
IBRA banks.]
04/10/98 M -1.56 -2.20 -0.64
• Government announces that it will provide subordinated loans
to banks whose capital has been increased by the owners.
[Target date for restricting liquidity support, ability to sell bad
assets to AMC (IBRA) for these same banks announced.]
06/24/98 M -0.50 0.35 0.84
• Announcement that ‘strong’ banks will be recapitalized by the
government. Full details will be developed by the end of
September. [Intervention in 7 banks, measures to promote
corporate restructuring, negotiations about repayment liquidity
support with a few banks, tax stimulation of mergers.]
08/21/98 M 0.92 -2.76 **-3.65
• Key elements of recapitalization program announced:
Government contributes 80% of the capital needed if a bank is
eligible for capital support.
09/29/98 -1.12 -1.38 -0.27
Korea
• Government announces that  it will provide capital support to
KFB by buying stocks and bonds. [Announcement that KFB
and some merchant banks will receive special loans at below
market rates, guarantees on all foreign liabilities of Korean
Banks, more funds to KAMCO for buying up bad loans.]
08/25/97 M 0.95 0.46 -0.49
• Commercial banks need to achieve minimum capital standards
by recapitalizing themselves (i.e. no capital support).
[Reversion of liquidity support, blanket guarantees only until
end of 2000, insolvent fi’s will be closed, acceleration of
disposal NPLs, amendment of law to allow participation by
foreign investors.]
12/05/97 M 2.77 **6.30 **3.53
• Seoul Bank and Korean First Bank announce that the
government will inject in total 1.4 billion won  in these banks in
exchange for shares.
12/08/97 *2.93 1.61 -1.32
• Letter of Intent states that existing shareholders will bear the
first burden. In addition, Seoul Bank and Korean First Bank
will be placed under intensive supervision and will be taken
over, resulting in a equity write down. [IMF agreement, ceiling
on foreign ownership will be completely lifted as of Dec 1998.]
12/24/97 M -0.10 -1.46 -1.37
• Government pledges 16 trillion won to recapitalize financial
institutions. [ More funds available to buy up NPLs.]
05/20/98 M **3.97 3.49 -0.48
Malaysia
• Only public funds for recapitalizations of firms and banks in
which government owns a stake. [There will be a new facility,
but it will include penalty rates and collateralization
requirements, capital requirements lifted, guarantees for buyers
if finance companies, transparency and better loan classification
and provisioning standards, more rigorous supervision,
limitation on single party lending.]
03/24/98 M 0.33 0.47 0.14
• Announcement that a SPV will be established to spearhead
recapitalization of the banking sector. It will serve as a strategic
shareholder.
07/13/98 -1.59 -3.49 -1.90
Thailand
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• No capital support for troubled institutions. They should
recapitalize themselves. [IMF agreement but funds cannot be
used for bail out of financial sector, BoT will continue to
provide liquidity support but subject to conditionality and at
higher rates, blanket guarantees will be phased out, AMC
announced but only for assets of intervened institutions, stricter
loan loss classification,  foreign participation encouraged.]
08/14/97 M 0.54 -0.17 -0.71
• Announcement that public funds will be available for
recapitalizations. [Intervention in 2 banks and 5 finance
companies: shareholder stakes eliminated, capital requirements
relaxed, development of framework for creation of private
AMCs.]
08/14/98 M **3.84 3.44 -0.40
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
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Panel E: Asset Management Companies
Event
Date
Mixed
Event
(M)
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Return
Bank
Index
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Cials
Indonesia:
• Announcement that the bad assets of four large state banks will
be transferred to a new government owned ‘credit settlement
company’. [Four large state banks will be merged.]
01/01/98 M -2.63 -0.41 2.22
• Announcement that the government will establish an asset
management company. The AMC will absorb the assets of the 7
banks that were intervened in on April 4 as well as the troubled
assets of other IBRA banks. [Government will issue $18 billion
in bonds to recapitalize banking sector through IBRA.]
04/10/98 M -1.56 -2.20 -0.64
• Statement that mid-July, a presidential decree will be issued
providing appropriate legal power to the IBRA and its Asset
Management Unit to deal with assets.  The AMU will both
serve as an entity to which bad assets of frozen banks by IBRA
and as an entity to which bad assets of banks that are relatively
strong that are recapitalized by the government. [Liquidity
support restrictions, capital support for strong banks.]
06/24/98 M -0.50 0.34 0.84
Note: from 16 October on, transfer of bad assets within IBRA from
banks controlled by IBRA (after freeze, or intervention) to its Asset
Management Unit.
Korea
• Government announces support for troubled financial
institutions by letting KAMCO buy up assets. [Korea First
Bank will receive a special loan to meet liquidity needs.]
08/18/97 M -0.63 -1.45 -0.82
• More funds to KAMCO for buying up bad loans than
announced before. [Announcement that KFB and some
merchant banks will receive special loans at below market rates,
guarantees on all foreign liabilities of Korean Banks, capital
support for KFB.]
08/25/97 M 0.95 0.46 -0.49
• More funds to buy bad loans. [Temporary liquidity support
announced , full guarantee announced, request to Japan to roll
over short-term debt owed by Korean banks, exchange rate
band widened.]
11/19/97 M 0.61 0.68 0.07
• KAMCO fund will be expanded to buy more than 50% of the
bad loans at the nation’s banks. [Reversion of liquidity support,
Blanket guarantees only until end of 2000, insolvent fi’s will be
closed, recapitalization requirement without support, more
funds for buying bad loans, amendment of law to allow
participation by foreign investors.]
12/05/97 M 2.77 **6.30 **3.53
• Government pledges 25 trillion won to buy bad loans from
financial institutions. [Government pledges 16 trillion won for
recapitalizations.]
05/20/98 M **3.97 3.49 -0.48
Malaysia
• Government announces that it will set-up an agency to buy non-
performing loans.
05/20/98 **3.34 **5.03 1.69
• Government states that it hopes to raise 25 billion ringit to set
up AMC.
06/04/98 0.98 0.06 -0.92
• Legislation passes parliament to launch AMC (Danaharta). 07/16/98 -0.79 1.25 2.04
Thailand
• Development of framework for creation of private AMCs
[Intervention in 2 banks and 5 finance companies. Shareholder
stakes eliminated, provision of public funds to recapitalize fi’s,
capital requirements relaxed. ]
08/14/98 M **3.84 3.44 -0.40
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Note: Government also made announcements concerning the set up
of a AMC to deal with the assets of finance companies that were
already suspended, but these are neglected here.
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level
** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
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Appendix 2: A Chronology of Financial Restructuring Announcements during the
Asian Crisis and Bank Jitters
This appendix contains a chronology of policy announcements made by the governments
of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. It primarily contains announcements
concerning the government’s policy towards the financial sector. The sources for these
events are: The Asian Wall Street Journal (all issues from June 1997-September 1998),
official documents that are reported on the homepages of the IMF, central banks and
local governments of the four countries involved, the IMF (1999a,b) reports and papers
by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b), Enoch (2000) and Radelet and Sachs (1998).
We also relate these announcements to bank jitters, i.e. strong movements of bank stocks
in the local market. A jitter is defined as a stock price movement whose absolute value is
so large that it represent one of the 25 largest movements of that year. The jitters are
determined for both the excess return on the banking index and the uncorrected return on
the banking index. Excess returns are calculated as the return on bank stocks minus the
return of non-financials. These data are taken from Datastream’s Global Indices. The
days for measuring whether a jitter occurred include the event day as well as the first
trading day before and after the event date. The returns for the jitters are reported as well:
an ‘E’ stands for excess return on bank index while a ‘B’ stands for the return on the bank
index. Events that are accompanied by jitters are in  ITALICS and the returns that
represent jitters are both in  ITALICS and underlined. The thresholds for the jitters are
reported in Table A2.
Table A2: Absolute Value of Smallest Jitter (in %) and the number of jitters that fall within event
window of the announcements.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Absolute Value of Smallest
Jitter
1997
Excess Return Bank Stocks (E) 4.64 3.70 2.32 3.83
Return Bank Stocks (B) 6.72 5.88 4.28 6.21
1998
Excess Return Bank Stocks (E) 8.32 6.18 2.95 6.32
Return Bank Stocks (B) 8.86 8.34 5.36 8.43
Number of jitters within event
window of the announcements
(Percentage out of total of 25
jitters between brackets)
1997
Excess Return Bank Stocks (E) 2     (8%) 8   (32%) 3   (12%) 6   (24%)
Return Bank Stocks (B) 2     (8%) 13   (52%) 2     (8%) 5   (20%)
1998
Excess Return Bank Stocks (E) 8   (32%) 2     (8%) 7   (28%) 3   (12%)
Return Bank Stocks (B) 5   (20%) 2     (8%) 5   (20%) 2     (8%)
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Indonesia
1997
July 12: Exchange rate band widened.
Aug. 14: Decision to let the rupiah float.
08/14/97 08/15/97
E:        -4.70 E:        -7.30
B: -4.67 B:        -10.66
Oct. 8: Government agrees to request IMF for long-term support funds and for help to strengthen the
financial sector.  IMF indicates that it will help Indonesia.
Oct. 20: Bank Indonesia eases local bank’s access to funds through lower interest rates and reserve
requirements.
Oct. 30: Announcement that Indonesia and IMF have agreed in principle on an aid package, which will be
‘strong on financial sector reforms’ and will involve more than $17 billion.
10/30/97
E: 1.51
B:        8.76
Oct. 31/Nov. 1: Letter of Intent: $33 billion rescue package. 16 banks are/will be closed (3% of assets). No
guarantees except for small depositors (Rp 20 million = US$ 5000) of closed banks; in future when
banking system is sound there will be an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Shareholder losses will not be
compensated and liabilities of nonfinancial companies will not be guaranteed. Some banks will be closely
monitored and will have to submit rehabilitation plans (there are already 10 banks that have contractual
obligations for this), these banks will not be extended any special (below market rates) credit facilities
unless they are hit by a bank run), if plans are insufficient they will be closed. Special liquidity support will
be phased out gradually. Reduction of state ownership of banks. Institutional framework will be improved
(central bank level, bank liquidation, collateral perfection, foreclosure, loan classification and loss
provisioning).
10/30/97
E: 1.51
B:        8.76
Nov. 1 : Closure of 16 banks.
Nov. 5: IMF formally approves stand-by credit.
1998
Jan. 1: Announcement that four large state banks will be merged and that their bad assets will be
transferred to a new government owned ‘credit settelement company’.
Jan. 12: IMF and Jakarta appear close to resolving differences so that a new package can be agreed upon.
01/13/98
E:        -12.43
B: -1.29
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Jan. 14: Indonesia and IMF are near an accord on a bailout that will include an acceleration of long-
overdue reforms. The provisional plan will raise capital requirements of banks and will allow foreign
majority ownership of banks.
01/13/98
E:        -12.43
B: -1.29
Jan. 15: Second IMF package agreed upon: acceleration of old measures and new measures. No extra
funds from IMF, but in the previous weeks there was the question of whether or not the IMF still supported
Indonesian policies.  Specific plans to restore banking system and to alleviate difficulties of the corporate
sector are to be announced soon.
01/16/98
E:        16.04
B:        23.89
Jan. 21/22: IMF states that Indonesia will come with an announcement of new measures to restore
confidence in banking sector.
01/21/98
E:        -8.55
B: -2.99
Jan. 26: Announcement that next day, Indonesia will announce sweeping banking-sector reforms, which
are worked out with the IMF. Details are not known but bankers following negotiations say major elements
will be deposit insurance and the creation of a new restructuring agency.
01/26/98 01/27/98
E:        -12.14 E:        11.69
B: -5.44 B:        11.88
Jan. 27: Announcements made by Indonesia for rehabilitation of banking sector. Guarantees for all
depositors and creditors of commercial banks. Freeze on debt service suggested, which was already the
actual state of affairs because repayments were not made anyway. Establishment of IBRA which will be
given great power to deal with restructuring of weak banks. There is a process to put in place a framework
for creditor and debtors to deal on a voluntary case-by-case basis and which will involve no public funds.
Strengthening of bankruptcy procedures promised.
01/26/98 01/27/98
E:        -12.14 E:        11.69
B: -5.44 B:        11.88
Feb. 14: Not public information, kept secret: IBRA’ intervenes’ in 54 banks that borrowed heavily on
emergency facilities and which control 40% of the assets of the banking sector. Owners/managers were
summoned to BI: no removal of management and no direct consequences for the position of shareholders,
just close surveillance through officials of IBRA that were placed in banks.
02/13/98
E:        -8.95
B: -6.50
Feb. 26: Talks between steering committee of foreign bank creditors and corporate debtors started.
Feb. 27: BI promulgated new loan classification and loss provision. Announcement that by June,
restrictions on foreign ownership of banks will be eliminated. Announcement that a group of institutions
are working on a framework for corporate debt restructuring.
March 23: IMF team announces progress in discussions of first review
March 29: Progress towards new IMF deal is faster-than-expected.
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April 1: Announcement of a tentative agreement between IMF and Indonesia. Justice minister is being
ordered to quickly draft a new bankruptcy law.
April 4: Using liquidity support as an indicator, IBRA intervenes by de facto taking control over 7 large
and 7 small banks: deposits transferred and IBRA will operate these banks (not a closure, two banks are
listed) the rights of owners and managers of the 7 large banks are suspended. Banks involved received 75%
of the total amount of liquidity support and hold 16% of the assets of the banking system.
04/03/98
E: 7.28
B:        10.77
April 8: IMF concludes first review and the revised terms for IMF-led package are announced.  The
banking (and structural) reforms agreed on Jan 15 will be expanded to accelerate the restructuring of banks
and a government-backed plan to restructure $68 billion in foreign corporate debt though a roll-over where
the central bank will take on the foreign exchange risk for companies. Access to liquidity support will be
more restrictive and difficult (at higher rates). Position of IBRA will be strengthened. Details on
bankruptcy and judicial reforms are provided (not effective yet).
April 10: Memorandum for IMF agreement made public. The government announces that it will issue $18
billion in bonds to recapitalize the banking sector through the IBRA and that it will establish an asset
management company. The AMC will absorb the assets of the 7 banks that were intervened in on April 4 as
well as the troubled assets of other IBRA banks.
April 14: IBRA suspends rights of owners and management of the 7 large banks that they intervened in on
April 3.
April 22: Bankruptcy law amended.
April 24: Announcement that a Jakarta Court for bankruptcy will be set up.
June 4: After months of negotiations, Indonesia authorities reach an agreement with steering committee of
creditor banks on a deal to support restructuring of external debt of the banking and corporate sector. For
the debt of Indonesian banks, the agreement consists of a roll-over with full dollar guarantee from Bank of
Indonesia. For corporate debt, framework for voluntarily restructuring provided with a government
exchange guarantee to creditors and debtors who agree to restructure on certain minimum conditions. Debt
restructuring agency Indra to be established on a scheme similar to FICORCA in Mexico. Indra does not
take commercial risk but ensures foreign payments to the creditor on the basis of rupiah payments received
from the debtor.
June 24/25: Additional IMF reforms agreed by Indonesia. Letter of Intent: Target date for restrictions on
liquidity support is 1 Nov. The government will provide tier-two capital (subordinated loans) to banks
whose capital has been increased by the owners. These same banks will be able to sell bad assets to an
AMC, which will be a unit within IBRA, at fair prices.
July 16: Indonesia secures $6 billion in extra funds from IMF, World Bank and other international lenders.
07/16/98
E: 10.67
B:        11.93
July 29: Indonesia asks for cancellation of IMF arrangement to replace it with another. Letter of Intent: A
program for the recapitalziation of stronger banks, in exchange for the infusion of capital by their owners,
is being developed and will be announced by August 21.
Aug. 21: Government announces major bank restructuring package that covers banks that account for
almost half of the banking systems assets. 7 banks are taken over by the government, wiping out the stakes
of the equityholders. At least 3 of these will be closed. Government will claim funds by past owners (which
includes Suharto associated). Based on LOI of Sept. 11, 1998, the measures also relate to a recapitalization
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of stronger banks, finalization of restructuring plans for 4 large state-owned banks, additional measures to
promote corporate restructuring such as debt-equity conversions, tax disadvantage of merger will be offset.
Aug. 28 (Friday): IMF approval of an extended facility.
08/31/98
E:        -10.78
B: -8.60
Sept. 9: Announcement of Jakarta Initiative (to guide and streamline out-of-court corporate restructuring),
which complements newly amended bankruptcy laws.
09/10/98
E:        -8.74
B: -7.80
Sept. 11: Memorandum: no new info.
Sept. 29: Bank Indonesia announces key elements of bank recapitalization program for the potentially
viable private banks. To become eligible, banks need a minimum capital adequacy and viable plans.
Information from letter of intent of October 19, 1998 and letter of intent of November 13, 1999 about this
plan: Government contributes up to 80% of the capital needed in form of long-term government bonds.
Shareholder equity will be written down commensurately with adequate provisioning for NPLs and other
assets. Loan classification and provisioning is under way.
Oct. 16: Amended bank law passes parliament, which provides the IBRA with the power to deal with the
assets of intervened banks.
10/16/98
E: -2.96
B:        9.62
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Korea
1997
Aug. 18: South Korea says it will help troubled financial institutions by buying assets of ailing institutions
through KAMCO, which is allowed to raise its funding with 1.5 trillion won. Principle agreement about a
special loan to Korea First Bank (KFB) from KAMCO to meet liquidity problems. It remains unclear
whether the central bank will also provide special loans to KFB or other banks.
Aug. 25: Government announces that it will provide special loans at below market rates to KFB and some
merchant banks. Guarantee of foreign/external liabilities of Korean banks. The government will provide
capital support to KFB by acquiring stocks and bonds (no amounts named). The government allows
KAMCO to form a 3.5 trillion won fund (in stead 1.5 trillion) to buy bad loans.
Nov. 19: Newly appointed Minister of Finance and Economics announces financial support measures to
stem financial crisis: Announcement of full guarantee on principal and interest on all types of deposits of
Korean fi’s until end of 2000. Bailout fund to buy bad loans is boosted to 10 trillion from 3.5 trilllion.
(Other announcement: Band for Won is widened.)
11/20/97
E:        4.37
B: 2.01
Nov. 20: Korea asks Japan to request its banks to roll over short-term owed by Korean banks/firms.
11/20/97 11/21/97
E:        4.37 E: 1.08
B: 2.01 B:        6.88
Nov. 21: Announcement that Korea would ask IMF for assistance. Financial reform is expected to be a key
part of the IMF’s conditions.
11/20/97 11/21/97
E:        4.37 E: 1.08
B: 2.01 B:        6.88
Nov. 27: Minister of Finance and Economics says that he expects financial aid from the IMF to far exceed
the initial target of $20 billion. Additional market stabilization steps announced: domestic banks minimum
currency reserves to cover losses from bad loans will be raised.
11/26/97 11/27/97 11/28/97
E:        -3.83 E:        -7.00 E:        -3.99
B: -2.11 B:        -7.31 B:        -8.17
Dec. 1 (Monday): After claiming in the morning that the IMF deal was completed, Korea and the IMF
state that the deal has yet to be finalized. Officials and bankers argue that the government and the IMF
disagree about financial restructuring, where the government prefers to avoid outright closures.
11/28/97 12/01/97 12/02/97
E:        -3.99 E:        -4.67 E:        8.45
B:        -8.17 B:        -6.26 B: 4.70
Dec. 2: 9 merchant banks are suspended. They need to develop plans for rehabilitation within 30 days. If
these are rejected by the government, they will be closed. There will be no KAMCO program participation
or financing from deposit insurance fund for the banks. The government also announces that they expect
the IMF deal to be signed on Dec. 3.
12/01/97 12/02/97 12/03/97
E:        -4.67 E:        8.45 E:        3.72
B:        -6.26 B: 4.70 B:        6.61
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Dec. 3: Announcement of agreement with the IMF on bailout for $55 billion. No details supplied about the
conditions that Korea must meet. IMF states that financial-sector reforms will be far reaching.
12/02/97 12/03/97 12/04/97
E:        8.45 E:        3.72 E: 0.17
B: 4.70 B:        6.61 B:        7.57
Dec. 5 (Friday): Letter of Intent/Financial restructuring policy made public: Large liquidity injections of
recent weeks will be reversed. Present blanket guarantees will be phased out and replaced by limited
deposit insurance schemes. Insolvent fi’s will be closed. 2 cb’s need to prepare rehab plans; if these are
insufficient they will be closed. Other cb’s need to make full provisioning and need to agree to achieve
minimum capital standards, make rehab plans and achieve recapitalization themselves (i.e. shareholders
carry burden). All support will be on market-oriented terms and solely as a part of viable rehabilitation
plans. Loss sharing rules between creditors and debtors will be established. Disposal of non-performing
loans is accelerated so as to buy up 50% of the bad loans of the nation’s banks. Restructuring could
involve mergers and acquisitions by domestic and foreign institutions. Amendment of law to allow
participation of foreign investors (after elections). Consolidated deposit insurance company will be created
which will be financed by government backed bonds. Foreign banks will be able to acquire Korean banks
and set up units in Korea.
12/04/97 12/05/97 12/08/97
E: 0.17 E: 0.13 E:        8.00
B:        7.57 B:        7.58 B: 3.73
Dec. 8: Seoul Bank and Korean First Bank announce that the government will inject 1.1 trillion won and
300 billion won respectively by absorbing new shares.
12/08/97 12/09/97
E:        8.00 E: 0.66
B: 3.73 B:        -6.47
Dec. 10: Operations of 5 merchant banks suspended. These need to submit restructuring plans before the
end of January.
12/09/97 12/11/97
E: 0.66 E: -1.86
B:        -6.47 B:        -7.12
Dec. 12 (Friday): ceiling on aggregate foreign ownership of listed shared from 26 to 50.
12/11/97 12/12/97 12/15/97
E: -1.86 E: -0.36 E: 2.24
B:        -7.12 B:        -7.85 B:        13.33
Dec. 15: Responding to a request of Korea, IMF declares that it will consider speeding up a bailout.
12/15/97 12/16/97
E: 2.24 E: 3.50
B:        13.33 B:        7.56
Dec. 24: IMF accelerates loan disbursement of $10 billion. Letter of Intent: Stresses that existing
shareholders will bear first burden. 2 large cb’s (SB and KFB) will be placed under intensive supervision
and as of Feb 25, government will take control over these institutions, write down equity of current
shareholders, replace management and transfer bad assets to KAMCO. (Ceiling on foreign ownership will
be raised to 55 as of Dec 30 . By the end of 1998, the ceiling will be completely lifted.)
12/23/97
E: -0.23
B:        -8.21
Dec. 29: Key reform bill passes national assemble: unification of regulatory bodies for the financial sector.
Newly elected government commits to restructuring program this way. Japanese and US banks declare that
they are willing to convert their short-term loans to Korean banks into longer-term loans guaranteed by the
central bank of Korea.
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Dec. 30: Bridge merchant bank was established to pay off depositors and manage suspended merchant
banks.
1998
Jan. 7/8: Talks between Seoul officials and commercial bankers on further roll-overs of South Korean
short-term bank debt were positive, but no agreements were reached. Foreign banks suggest to convert
Korean commercial bank debt into government bonds. South Korea’s Finance Ministry suggests that it may
be open to guaranteeing the repackaged commercial debt. Talks resume on Jan. 19.
Jan. 11: South Korean officials object against plans for large-scale conversion of short-term commercial
bank debt into government bonds.
Jan. 16: Agreement with foreign banks for a complete roll over of bank debt that is due in the 1Q98.
Jan. 29: Agreement (in principle) between Korea and foreign banks to restructure short-term debt (debt
service suspended through roll-over) finalized: $26 billion will be converted into debt with 1-3 years of
maturity, which will be backed partially by the government. Korea thereby resisted to bailout foreign
banks.
Jan. 30: Revocation of licenses of 10 merchant banks that were suspended early december.
Jan. 31: Government recapitalizes the Seoul Bank and KFB after writing down capital of existing
shareholders.
Feb. 2: Korea agrees to third IMF program.
Feb. 7: Letter of Intent: Establishment of special unit to coordinate and monitor bank restructuring. All cb’s
have to report capital adequacy ratios based on full provisioning; if below 8%, recapitalization plans
required by June. If these are not approved, appropriate measures will be adopted. KAMCO will purchase
loans meanwhile.
March 15: Agreement to roll-over $21 billion of Korean commercial bank debt into long-term debt with
government guarantees.
May 1: Credit ceilings on export financing lifted.
May 2(Saturday): Letter of Intent: 12 banks had insufficient capital ratios at the end of 1997 and rehab
plans are required from these banks.
05/04/98
E: -3.37
B:        -9.82
May 20: Ministry of Finance and Economy pledges 50 trillion won to buy bad loans (25 trillion won for
loans at a 50% discount) from fi’s, recapitalize banks (16 trillion) and to shore up depositor’s insurance (9
trillion). Up to that time, banks had to recapitalize themselves and public funds would only be used as a
last resort. However, the recapitalizations might be associated with nationalization of banks.
05/21/98
E:        7.98
B: 5.54
June 18: Korean banks, prodded by the government,  announce a list of 55 non-viable firms which will be
forced into bankruptcy.
06/17/98
E: 0.94
B:        9.00
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June 29: First commercial bank closures: 5 small ones (7% of the total for the commercial banking
sector).  2 merchant banks closed.
06/30/98
E:        -8.48
B: -7.69
Aug 20: Eligibility to obtain funds for export financing extended.
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Malaysia
Note: Malaysia did not have an IMF program.
1997
Oct. 19: Government announces that loan classification will be more strict (non-performing after three
months of nonpayment).
Dec. 5 (Friday): Finance Minister announces economic plan. Companies will not be bailed out and ‘banks
need to be protected against any excesses of their customers’. Measures require stricter and earlier
disclosure of NPLs, increase of bank provisions for bad debts and bar fresh lending to “nonproductive”
activities such as property development and stock purchases. Measures are aimed at achieving a
substantial reduction in credit growth.
12/08/97
E:        6.04
B:        16.58   
Dec. 30: Malaysian central banks says that it is speeding up plans for mergers among the country’s 35
finance companies. The merger plan calls for five or six large finance companies to absorb the other firms
and will be proposed to the companies this week.
12/30/97 12/31/97
E:        6.64 E:        2.56
B:        8.96 B: 2.64
1998
Jan. 2 (Friday): Authorities intensify efforts to consolidate finance sector, specifying that it would like to
see merger deals finalized by March 31.
01/02/98 01/05/98
E:        -5.77 E: -1.13
B:        -8.30 B:        -5.37
Jan. 20: Announcement of blanket guarantee for all depositors.
01/19/98 01/20/98
E:        4.83 E:        -3.03
B:        12.01 B: -2.57
Feb. 5: Malaysia toughens stance on merging finance firms. Finance ministry presents a blue print for
merging 39 finance companies into 6 groups. The government can’t force companies to merge, but officials
say finance companies that don’t merge won’t be bailed out should they run in difficulty.
02/04/98 02/05/98 02/06/98
E:        10.83 E:        3.23 E:        4.16
B:        7.50 B: 4.85 B: 5.15
Feb. 24: Government reaffirms that there will be no bailouts of domestic businesses hat falter because of
their debt burdens.
02/24/98
E:        4.34
B: 4.59
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March 3: Central bank announces the country’s sixth–largest bank (Sime) had recorded massive losses and
that it will need fresh capital to stay in business.
March 5: Prime Minister pledges to use state funds to aid the country’s ailing banks because these would
collapse otherwise. The premier didn’t say how much money might be used, or how it would be employed.
March 12: Deputy Prime Minister declares that Malaysia is committed to pursuing reforms similar to those
prescribed by the IMF, which includes letting troubled firms go bankrupt. The government will not bailout
troubled firms.
March 24: Further details of economic program announced. There will be a new liquidity support facility,
but it will include penalty rates and full collateralization. Public funds for recapitalizations will be available
but the government will only inject capital into government-owned banks or in companies and banks in
which the government holds a stake. Sharp raise in capital requirement for finance companies (minimum as
well as ratio). Buyers of finance companies will get a one-year government guarantee on the value of their
acquisition. All banks will be subjected to intensive and rigorous supervision (including stress tests).
Greater transparency and better loan classification and provisioning standards. Limitation on single party
lending,
May 13: Government reveals that stress-tests show that three banks need capital injections. Amount needed
is still being studied.
May 20: Government says that it will set up an agency to buy non-performing loans.
05/21/98
E:        6.08
B:        8.74
June 4: Government states that it hopes to raise 25 billion ringgit ($6.37 billion) to fund the AMC.
July 13: Announcement by Finance minister of SPV to complement Danaharta: Strategic shareholder that
should recapitalize and restructure weak banks by taking equity stakes.
July 16: Legislation passes parliament to launch AMC (Danaharta).
Aug. 6: Malaysia’s Finance Minister says that the recapitalization fund, called Danamodal, will involve a
$3.9 billion program.
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Thailand
1997
March 3: Announcement of problems in 10 unnamed finance companies and measures to strengthen
soundness of financial institutions: full provisions need to be made against possible loan losses. Increased
capital requirement for 10 financial institutions (if not met, FIDF will buy new shares and initiate changes).
03/03/97
E: na
B: na
March 10: Official statement that the government is intended to buy $4 billion in bad property debt from
financial institutions.
March-June: 66 finance companies secretly receive substantial liquidity support.
June 14 (Saturday): Cabinet issues 4 decrees that allow greater foreign ownership of banks and finance
companies and that provides for financial assistance to merging banks and finance companies.
06/16/97
E:        -3.93
B: -3.23
June 27: Suspension of operations of 16 finance companies, which are told to merge with other
institutions.
06/26/97
E: 1.36
B:        7.29
June 29: Prime Minister of Thailand states that the depositors and creditors of all finance and securities
companies other than those that are suspended will be protected.
July 2: Managed float established and IMF negotiations begin.
07/02/97 07/03/97
E: 0.24 E: 0.11
B:        8.97 B:        9.24
July 11: Bank of Thailand (BoT) denies that it has plans to suspend 5 medium-small sized banks.
Aug. 4: BoT announces that progress is made on IMF negotiations and that the cabinet is expected to
approve an economic recovery plan the next day. The Thai government said that the measures probably
include a reduction of government support for financial institutions and the establishment of a deposit
insurance corporation.
Aug. 5: Incomplete policy package announced. 42 finance companies suspended until they are either re-
capitalized, merged or liquidated (rehabilitation plans required within 60 days). The 33 remaining finance
companies and the 15 commercial banks will enjoy government guarantees for all deposits and most of
their creditors (excluding holders of debentures, convertible debentures and creditors with subordinated
rights).  Set up of a deposit insurance program. Announcement by the central bank that it had spent $19.3
before the managed float began to keep the 91 finance companies alive.
Aug. 13: Thailand and the IMF declare that they have reached an agreement on a policy package to
accompany a $16 billion loan. Officials stress that the funds can’t be used to bail out Thailand’s finance
sector.
Aug. 14: Letter of Intent: Main goal of program: isolate weaker institutions and support remaining ones
through liquidity injections and guarantees to depositors and creditors. However, all liquidity support will
42
be subject to conditionality and at higher rates. Creditors of finance companies that are suspended will
incur losses but the claims of depositors and creditors of other finance companies and banks are guaranteed.
Banks should make loan loss provisions on the basis of stricter classification requirements and raise
additional capital. Severely undercapitalized institutions that cannot raise their capital to the legally
required level will be taken over by the Financial Institutions Development Fund, which will involve
capital write downs of existing shareholders. No public funds for corporate or household borrowers.
Establishment of AMC is announced, which only serves to handle assets of intervened fi’s. Participation of
foreigners in banks will be encouraged. All other kinds of improvements for financial sector are announced
in general terms.
Aug. 19: Government approval of IMF plan.
08/18/97
E:        -4.12
B: -5.93
Aug. 20: IMF approval of credit.
Aug. 25: Central bank says it will tighten its rules on the classification of nonperforming loans, effective
Jan. 1 (from 12 months to 6 months).
08/25/97
E: -1.60
B:        -7.94
Aug. 27: BoT announces that it will propose a tax break for banks and finance companies that set aside
provisions against bad debt.
Oct. 6: Minister of Finance says that it pans to enact a law to protect depositors and creditors from future
failures in the financial sector. This will involve setting up a super-agency that will oversee the deposit
insurance program and an asset management company to recover bad debts.
10/07/97
E:        -4.39
B: -1.03
Oct. 10: Thai Finance Minister says that capital adequacy ratios will be raised from 8.5% to 12%.
Oct. 13 and 14: Thai government announces detailed strategy for restructuring financial sector: Law will
be amended so that control by BoT over fi’s can be exercised over institutions that have large losses and
that are unable to recapitalize. BoT threatens that for those banks, shareholder equity will be written down
to absorb losses and management will be replaced. Clarification of policy concerning suspended finance
companies: creation of AMC and Financial Restructuring Agency (FRA) to implement and oversee this
resolution process. FRA will also have responsibility for deposit guarantees. Loan classification and
provisioning will be tightened by the year 2000. Foreign ownership limits on Thai banks and finance
companies will be removed. 5 emergency decree will be passed by the cabinet within the next week to set
up the agency and to strengthen the power of the central bank.
Nov. 14: Details on loan provisioning and accrued interest.
Nov. 18: Thailand’s new government announces that it will stick to the IMF program. The government will
close  loss-making finance firms and separate their good assets from bad assets.
Nov. 25: Thailand revises agreement with IMF. Publication of full letter of intent. Liquidity access must be
tightened. Government is committed to decide on shut-down of the suspended finance companies within the
next few days and to deal with the assets of those permanently closed shortly thereafter.
11/24/97 11/25/97
E:        -4.79 E:        -4.77
B: -5.21 B:        -7.67
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Dec. 8: Decision by FRA  to close 56 of the 58 suspended finance companies.
12/08/97
E:        -5.51
B: 1.24
Dec. 31: Intervention takes place in 1 severely undercapitalized bank, Bangkok Metro Bank, that relied
heavily on liquidity support and that was unable to raise private capital: management is replaced and the
bank is ordered to raise new capital within two weeks.
1998
Jan. 23: Bangkok Metro Bank is taken over by the central banks. Its capital is written down after which it
is recapitalized by FDIF through a conversion of its loans.
01/22/98
E:        -6.32
B:        -8.49
Feb. 6: Central bank seizes control of two midsize banks. Equity is almost completely written down and
the banks are recapitalized by the FDIF. The same was done for a the Bangkok Bank of Commerce, which
has been under government control since May 1996.
Feb. 24: Thai plan further modified, agreement on third IMF program. Acceleration of restructuring of
financial system with respect to privatization of intervened banks. Best practice banking standards and
better supervision BoT. Acceleration of asset classification and loan provisioning policies through
memoranda of understanding with undercapitalized banks but no immediate enforcement (for which banks
feared).
March 4: Thai central bank announces that the total amount of loans they had outstanding to troubled
financial institutions equaled $16.4 billion on Feb. 19 and that it has spent $25.5 billion since mid-1996 to
prop up troubled financial institutions.
March 22: Central banks says that commercial banks need to raise $5 billion in new capital to comply with
tightened capital rules that will be officially announced this month.
March 31: New rules for Thai banks officially announced by the central bank: new loan-classification
system and new provisisoning levels.
May 13: Thai central bank governor says there will be no more closures of domestic financial institutions
but that the central bank may have to step in to help some survive.
May 14: Thai central bank says it may take over two cash-strapped finance companies.
May 18: Intervention in 7 finance companies that were unable to raise capital, need to write down capital.
May 26: Agreement on fourth IMF program.
June 3: Thai central bank relaxes loan-classification rules for category of ‘doubtful loans’.
July 28: Thailand’s cabinet approved a plan to raise capital for the AMC ($486 million).
07/29/98
E:        -7.54
B: -7.40
Aug. 4: Thailand’s central bank and the private sector reach a broad framework for the restructuring of
nonperforming loans. Legally nonbinding framework which lays down the steps through which creditors
and debtors can work through a restructuring of debts.
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Aug. 5: The Bank of Thailand announces that it will offer a five-year money back guarantee to foreign
investors taking over troubled Thai banks and finance companies.
Aug. 14: Thai government announces a bank-rescue plan. Nationalization of 2 small commercial banks
and 5 finance companies; equity written down and government loans are converted into equity. Provision
of public funds ($7 billion) to recapitalize all remaining financial institutions: government will issue bonds
and swap these for preferred shares in banks. Banks are allowed to set up their own private asset
management companies. Capital requirements are relaxed. Resolution plans announced for four
nationalized banks. Most of these plans were already made public by government officials on Aug. 13.
08/13/98 08/14/98
E:        7.75 E: 4.91
B: 4.24 B:        11.63
